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Provision of Liquidity 
through the Primary Credit 
Facility during the Financial 
Crisis: A Structural Analysis 
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n response to the liquidity crisis that began in August 2007, 
 central banks designed a variety of tools for supplying 
liquidity to financial institutions. The Federal Reserve 
introduced several programs, such as the Term Auction 
Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility, while enhancing its open market 
operations and discount window. This paper focuses on the 
financial market effects of changes to the discount window 
borrowing facility. Specifically, we investigate whether the 
changes represent a fundamental shift in the way the Federal 
Reserve traditionally provided liquidity through the primary 
credit facility as well as whether the Fed would be well served to 
retain these changes to its borrowing facility indefinitely. 
In January 2003, the Federal Reserve revised its discount 
window lending program. The revision was designed to 
improve the operation of the facility, which had experienced 
declines in usage. Before 2003, borrowing from the Fed took 
place at a rate below the market rate, known as the discount 
rate. Fed officials applied a non-price funds-rationing 
mechanism by asking potential borrowers detailed questions 
about their financial well-being before lending funds. This 
administrative process deterred depository institutions from 
using the discount window because borrowing from the Fed 
was perceived as a signal of financial weakness by market 
participants.1 
The revised discount window borrowing facility was 
designed to eliminate the reluctance to borrow from the Fed 
by including a new “no-questions-asked” policy for eligible 
borrowers. However, despite Fed assurance that the new facility 
would eliminate all administrative costs of borrowing, some 
argued that the stigma could not be eliminated completely 
(see, for example, Furfine [2001, 2003]). However, Artuç and 
Demiralp (2010) recently showed that the stigma of borrowing 
declined substantially in the post-2003 period, following the 
easing of the Fed’s administrative policy and restrictions. 
In this paper, we assess the effects of changes to the primary 
credit facility since August 2007 by performing out-of-sample 
simulations based on a model developed by Artuç and 
Demiralp (2010). Our results are highly consistent with the 
predictions of our 2008 study—that is, the revised discount 
window is effective and plays an essential role in moderating 
volatility in the federal funds market. 
1 See, for example, Goodfriend (1983), Pearce (1993), Dutkowsky (1993), 
Peristiani (1998), Clouse and Dow (1999), Furfine (2003), Dow (2001), 
and Darrat et al. (2004).
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2. Recent Changes to the Primary 
Credit Facility
The primary credit facility, as revised by the Federal Reserve 
in 2003, offered credit to financially sound banks at a rate 
100 basis points above the Federal Open Market Committee’s 
target federal funds rate (the primary credit rate). Primary 
credit was made available to depository institutions at an 
above-market rate but with very few administrative restrictions 
and no limits on the use of proceeds (see Madigan and Nelson 
[2002]). Because the interest rate charged on primary credit 
was above the market price of funds, it replaced the rationing 
mechanism for obtaining funds from the central bank and 
eliminated the need for administrative review by the Federal 
Reserve. 
Amid the onset of the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the 
Federal Reserve lowered the spread between the primary credit 
rate and the target funds rate from 100 basis points to 50 basis 
points and extended the maximum term of loans to thirty days. 
In March 2008, the Fed once again narrowed the spread, this 
time to 25 basis points, and extended the loan term to ninety 
days. The moves were motivated by the desire to make discount 
window credit more accessible to depository institutions. 
The Federal Reserve’s actions led to an increase in the 
volume of discount window borrowing during the crisis 
(Chart 1). The upper panel of the chart shows total primary 
credit outstanding since the establishment of the revised facility 
in 2003. The middle and lower panels, which split the sample at 
August 2007, illustrate the enormous rise in borrowing that 
occurred. 
While the massive increase in the volume of borrowing 
supports the argument that the stigma of borrowing had been 
eliminated, one should be cautious when interpreting this 
result. Chart 2, which plots the highest traded funds rate 
against the primary credit rate, shows that despite the 
expansion in borrowing, some trades in the funds market took 
place at rates above the primary credit rate. What is reassuring 
about these findings, however, is their consistency with the 
predictions of our earlier work. As Artuç and Demiralp (2010) 
describe, reluctance to borrow from the Fed has several 
components. The non-price mechanism is the component 
attributable to the Federal Reserve’s implementation of 
discount lending. Artuç and Demiralp show that this 
component declined significantly after the establishment of 
the revised facility in 2003. Meanwhile, a second type of stigma 
arises from the asymmetric information problems associated 
with discount window borrowing. Specifically, while most 
banks borrow from the discount window, the facility is also 
used by troubled or failing institutions. Because market 
participants cannot fully differentiate sound from troubled 
borrowers, they may view borrowing as a potential sign of 
weakness of any bank that visits the window. If this type of 
stigma increases at the early stages of a financial crisis, when 
institutions are trying to signal their good health, it could 
explain the spikes in the funds rate over the primary credit rate 
shown in Chart 1.2 In addition, it is plausible that the capital 
crunch during the financial crisis left some institutions without 
sufficient collateral to apply for primary credit loans and thus 
forced them to bid for higher rates in the federal funds market, 
which is unsecuritized. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 45
Chart 2
Daily High Funds Rate and Primary Credit Rate
Weekly Average
Sources: Daily high funds rate: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 















3.T h e  M o d e l
The model we describe closely resembles the one developed 
in Artuç and Demiralp (2010), which can be viewed as an 
extension of the model proposed by Clouse and Dow (1999). 
Hence, our discussion relies heavily on Section 3 of Artuç and 
Demiralp (2010). We consider a framework in which bank i’s 
goal is to keep its daily reserves holdings at a level  . Daily 
reserve balances vary over the course of the maintenance 
period (see Carpenter and Demiralp [2006]). However, from 
the borrower’s perspective, a bank’s decision to borrow from 
the Fed is static based on liquidity conditions each day. 
Therefore, we do not differentiate across days of the 
maintenance period except for the settlement Wednesday, 
which may necessitate higher borrowing because banks have 
less flexibility in absorbing any reserve shortages on the last day 
of the maintenance period. On this day, the desired level of 
reserve holdings is determined by  .
Banks’ balance holdings follow a stochastic process. During 
the day, there are aggregate and individual shocks to the 
2 Indeed, a closer look at the days with spikes in the funds rate reveals that 
market commentaries are consistent with elevated asymmetric information 
problems. An extreme example is October 25, 2007, when the highest traded 
funds rate exceeded the primary credit rate by almost 10 percentage points. 
On that date, Wrightson ICAP reported that “the stigma of discount window 
borrowing was heightened by the news that the New York Fed had extended 
$400 million of secondary-credit loans on Wednesday. If word got out that 
a given institution had tapped the window on Thursday, the market might 
speculate that the bank in question was the same one that had been forced 
to make use of the higher-cost secondary credit program for shaky institutions 
the day before. The reputational damage of a leak of that nature would be 
disastrous” (Wrightson ICAP, Fed Funds Monitor, http://www.wrightson.com).
L1
L2
average level of reserve balances ( ), which sets the balance 
of bank i equal to:
(1)                                ,
where   is an aggregate shock3 and 
 is an individual shock where   is the 
standard deviation of the aggregate shock while   represents 
the support of the mean zero uniform distribution. Hence, the 
individual bank becomes a lender in the funds market if   
and demands funds if   for  .
Banks that are short of reserves have two options: they can 
either borrow from the funds market or from the Federal 
Reserve. If the bank chooses to borrow   dollars from the 
funds market, the cost per dollar is the market interest rate  . 
Alternatively, if the bank borrows   dollars from the Federal 
Reserve, the cost per dollar is the discount rate (or the primary 
credit rate after 2003),  , plus a fixed cost c. Thus, total cost per 
dollar is  . Because of the fixed cost, partial borrowing 
from the Federal Reserve is not optimal, and a bank either 
prefers to borrow entirely from the Federal Reserve or from the 
funds market.4
In addition to borrowing from the Federal Reserve because 
of market conditions, banks borrow because of technical 
difficulties, such as network problems that force them to use 
the Fed regardless of market conditions. To capture this type of 
borrowing, we assume that a random fraction of banks,  , will 
face a technical problem in the system where   has a uniform 
distribution: .
We assume that there is a continuum of banks, indexed 
from 0 to 1. Thus, there are an infinite number of banks with 
zero individual measure whose measure integrates to 1. We 
index according to reserve balance levels, such that a bank with 
the lowest level of reserve balances is indexed to 0 and one with 
the highest level of reserve balances is indexed to 1. 
Total demand for funds has two components: It can be met 
in the funds market or it can be met at the discount window. 
The equilibrium federal funds rate,  , is determined by the 
market equilibrium when the total supply of funds is equal to 
the total demand for funds. In modeling borrowing behavior, 
our focus is on individual trades in the funds market and on 
days of market tightness because borrowing from the Fed on 
3 Because the original model is estimated by removing the outliers, we subtract 
0.5 percent from the tails of the normal distribution.
4 Without loss of generality, one may think of the fixed costs of borrowing as 
varying by bank, reflecting each bank’s relative reluctance to borrow from the 
discount window based on factors such as the size of the borrowing, the history 
of borrowing, or the availability of credit lines in the funds market. While 
we model it in a homogenous manner for simplicity, modeling it in a 
heterogeneous manner is also trivial and does not change any implications 
of our model. 
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these days is more likely. Therefore, we set the daily high funds 
rate equal to:
(2)                    where  .
Equation 2 shows that the maximum funds rate registered 
for a given day will differ from the equilibrium funds rate 
depending on the reserves need and the bargaining power faced 
by the counterparties of that particular trade, represented 
by  . 
Turning to the days without market tightness, we note that 
trades are almost always cleared in the funds market unless 
there is a technical problem. For that reason and without loss 
of generality, if supply is larger than demand, we simply set 
the funds rate ( ) equal to the marginal benefit of holding 
balances, as in Clouse and Dow (1999). Hence, a bank can offer 
reserves in the funds market if the market rate is greater than 
the marginal benefit of holding balances.
 If the fixed costs of borrowing decline in the period after 
2003, then, all else equal, it implies a decline in the volatility of 
the funds rate in the post-2003 period and an increase in the 
sensitivity of discount window borrowing to the funds rate. 
(A more detailed discussion of the implications of the model 
can be found in Artuç and Demiralp [2010].) This implied 
change in volatility and the revival of the borrowing function 
allow us to identify the size of the implicit cost before and 
after 2003. 
If we could attribute the entire decline in fed funds volatility 
to the revised discount facility, we could proceed with 
estimation without any second thoughts. However, the decline 
in fed funds volatility is also influenced by other developments, 
such as enhanced liquidity management by the Federal 
Reserve’s Trading Desk (see Demiralp and Farley [2005]), 
improvements in internal information systems (including 
those that track a bank’s Federal Reserve account balance), 
or banking industry consolidation. To minimize the effects of 
such factors on fed funds volatility, we keep our sample period 
relatively recent, starting it in 1998. Furthermore, to control for 
any remaining effects of such factors, we allow the distributions 
of   and   to widen or narrow in a linear fashion over time. 
That is, we let:
(3)                 and  ,
where t is the time trend,   and   are defined after equation 1.
To identify the potential decrease in the stigma associated 
with discount window borrowing, we consider the following 
specification for the implicit borrowing cost c :
, prior to 2003
, after 2003.
Note that the above specification treats the implicit costs 
of borrowing as exogenously determined. An alternative and 
more plausible strategy would be to model the costs of 
rt
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borrowing as a function of the amount borrowed from the 
Federal Reserve. However, modeling the cost of borrowing 
endogenously cannot be identified in this study, so the issue 
remains a topic for future research.5
To estimate our model, we rely on “indirect inference,” 
which uses the estimates of an auxiliary model (rather than 
moments) to compare actual and simulated data. Because we 
can think of data moments as the parameters of a simplified 
auxiliary model, Method of Simulated Moments (or GMM) 
can be considered special cases of indirect inference. An 
auxiliary model does not need to be “correct” for indirect 
inference to yield consistent results. As long as the selected 
auxiliary model summarizes the data well, the estimates of the 
actual model will be consistent and asymptotically normal. 
This is because the auxiliary model is used only to extract 
information on the underlying data-generating process and, 
provided that the parameter estimates from the actual data are 
close to those from the simulated data, whether both estimates 
are biased or not is of secondary importance. In other words, 
the auxiliary parameter estimates themselves do not carry 
much meaning other than being indicators of how closely the 
simulations match the data (see Artuç and Demiralp [2010]; 
for a more technical reading on indirect inference, see 
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault [1993] and Smith [1993]). 
We contemplate a simple borrowing function as the 
auxiliary model. The auxiliary borrowing function summarizes 
how borrowing from the Fed changed over time and after the 
policy change in 2003 through a simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, shown in equation 4. In addition to OLS 
estimates, we use the mean and the variances of borrowing and 
the spread between the daily high funds rate and the target as 
part of the auxiliary model (equations 5-8). We also add the 
lowest 50 percent of the spread between the daily high funds 
rate and the target to capture funds rate volatility in the absence 
of market tightness (equations 9 and 10). The estimation 
strategy is to find the parameters that will make the simulations 
of the model and the actual data look as similar as possible with 
respect to the auxiliary model’s OLS estimates and moments. 
Specifically, our auxiliary model is: 
(4)  
(5)                                    
(6)                                     
(7)                            
(8)                             
5 We thank Carolyn Wilkins for bringing this point to our attention.
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Chart 3
Daily High Funds Rate Less Target
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (daily high funds rate: 
http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 
(target: http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 


















Normalized with Required Operating Balances
Sources: Primary credit outstanding: Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release H.4.1; required operating balances: Federal Reserve Board; 
simulated series: authors’ calculations.
Note: Required operating balances is the sum of required reserve 


















(9)                                  
(10)                         
and
                                  ,
where   is the amount of borrowing from the Fed 
normalized by required operating balances,   is the spread 
between the funds rate and the funds rate target, t is the time 
trend,   is a dummy for days after the policy change, 
 is a dummy for the settlement Wednesday,   is 
an iid random shock, T is sample size, and   is the lowest 
50 percent of  . 
Let   be an OLS estimate of   from the actual data 
and   be an estimate of  from the simulated data. We select 
the model’s parameters   such that   
 is minimized, where W is the weighting 
matrix that is equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of   .
In estimating the model, we exclude those days on which 
the daily high funds rate exceeds the target rate by more than 
25 percent to obtain a more realistic distribution of shocks. 
Our estimation results, presented in the appendix, suggest that 
the implicit fixed cost of borrowing declines about 90 percent 
(from 0.054 to 0.007) after the policy change in 2003. This 
result offers strong evidence that the Fed’s new policy was 
indeed successful in reducing the stigma associated with 
discount window borrowing. 
4. Simulation Analysis
In this section, we use our model to analyze the role of the 
Federal Reserve’s primary credit lending facility in stabilizing 
the money markets in the face of the liquidity crisis. 
Specifically, we ask the following questions: 
1. What are the effects of the establishment of the revised 
lending facility on total borrowing and interest rates? 
In particular, how would the crisis picture look if the 
implicit costs of borrowing had not been reduced with 
the new regime in 2003?
2. What are the implications of the increased term of 
discount lending in the funds markets?
3. What are the effects of narrowing the spread between 
the primary credit rate and the target rate in stabilizing 
the money markets?
4. What are the implications for discount window 
borrowing of paying interest on reserves?
Recall that the model described earlier is designed to 
capture the “normal times” of healthy functioning markets. 
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Our estimation period captures a period of a relatively stable 
structural environment. The sample starts on June 30, 1998, 
with the switch from contemporaneous reserves accounting to 
lagged reserves accounting. It ends on March 19, 2007, a few 
months prior to the onset of the liquidity crisis in August 2007. 
Indeed, if we use the estimates from our model for out-of-
sample simulations, the severity of the crisis and the model’s 
inability to forecast this environment become clear. Charts 3 
and 4 compare actual data with the model’s out-of-sample 
simulations for the deviation of the daily high funds rate from 
the target and for primary credit outstanding, respectively. 48 Provision of Liquidity through the Primary Credit Facility
Chart 5
Daily High Funds Rate Less Target 
(with Benchmark Simulation)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (daily high funds rate: 
http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 
(target: http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 




















Primary Credit Outstanding 
(with Benchmark Simulation)
Normalized with Required Operating Balances
Sources: Primary credit outstanding: Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release H.4.1; required operating balances: Federal Reserve Board; 
simulated series: authors’ calculations.
Note: Required operating balances is the sum of required reserve 

















While it is a daily model, we present the results in terms of 
monthly averages for visual clarity. The vertical line in each 
chart corresponds to the end of our estimation period in 
March 2007. There is a wide discrepancy between the data and 
the model’s simulations, indicating that the period after 
August 2007 represents quite extraordinary circumstances 
that cannot be captured by the estimates prior to August 2007, 
as we would expect. 
The sizable discrepancy between the data and the 
simulations for the crisis period suggests that we should 
incorporate the crisis circumstances into our model before we 
can conduct counterfactual experiments on the efficiency of 
the Federal Reserve’s policies. At this point, we make several 
assumptions to replicate conditions during the crisis. To 
capture the overall need for short-term liquidity, we increase 
the volatility of the aggregate shock  . Furthermore, the 
increase in the term of the borrowing is expected to reduce the 
implicit costs of borrowing by making it more convenient to 
lengthen the duration of a loan.6 
To match the moments of the data, we double the standard 
error of the aggregate shock   and reduce the costs of 
borrowing by one half, which allows us to obtain more 
reasonable estimates for the interest rate spread and the volume 
of borrowing during the crisis period (Charts 5 and 6). We call 
these simulations the “benchmark simulations.” In evaluating 
6 The Federal Reserve may have also reduced the implicit costs of discount 
borrowing indirectly by introducing several other lending facilities and making 
overall borrowing more accessible. 
Ut
Ut
the model’s performance, one should be careful not to use the 
“eyeball metric” to compare the simulated series with the actual 
data, because it gives the wrong impression that the model’s 
goal is to match the actual data on a day-by-day basis. Instead, 
our goal is to match the underlying data-generating process, 
and our estimation results, presented in the appendix, show 
that the model does reasonably well in achieving this goal. 
Indeed, even if we match the underlying data-generating 
process perfectly, the simulated series will differ from the actual 
data because of the presence of random shocks. 
We now analyze the questions raised at the beginning of this 
section. The first involves the effects of the 2003 policy change 
on mitigating the crisis after 2007. In other words, had the Fed 
not changed its lending policy in 2003, how would the funds 
market look? Based on our findings in Artuç and Demiralp 
(2010), we would expect funds market volatility to worsen 
significantly in the absence of the new regime because the 
current practice allows institutions in need of funds to utilize 
this service without much hesitation. Chart 7 confirms our 
expectations. The chart plots the actual spread between the 
daily high funds rate and the target (the dashed line) as well as 
the simulations generated by our benchmark model (the blue 
line). In addition, it shows the spread under the counterfactual 
experiment, where the cost of borrowing remains at its 
pre-2003 level (the gray line). As the chart reveals, the 
counterfactual series skyrockets during the crisis period, 
suggesting that the Federal Reserve’s switch to the new lending FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 49
Chart 7
Daily High Funds Rate Less Target 
(with No Policy Change in 2003)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (daily high funds rate: 
http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 
(target: http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 















No policy change 
in 2003
Chart 8
Daily High Funds Rate Less Target 
(with No Decrease in Cost of Borrowing)
Sources: Primary credit outstanding: Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release H.4.1; required operating balances: Federal Reserve Board; 
simulated series: authors’ calculations.
Note: Required operating balances is the sum of required reserve 




















Daily High Funds Rate Less Target 
(with No Change in Spread)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (daily high funds rate: 
http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 
(target: http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 



















No change in spread
regime was very effective in containing the severity of the crisis 
in the money markets. 
Turning from prices to quantities, we note that the volume 
of borrowing cannot differ between the two regimes because 
in our model banks have to borrow the necessary amount of 
reserve balances to avoid an overdraft or a reserve deficiency. 
For this reason, in reporting our simulation results, we present 
only the spread between the daily high funds rate and the target 
rate and not the borrowing behavior when the latter is 
unaffected under different scenarios. 
Next, we analyze the effectiveness of changes in the primary 
credit facility that the Federal Reserve introduced at the 
beginning of the crisis. Recall that our benchmark model 
implies a 50 percent decline in borrowing costs during the crisis 
period. In assessing the implications of extended terms of 
borrowing, we keep the fixed cost of borrowing at its precrisis 
level and simulate the interest rate spread under this scenario. 
Chart 8 displays our results. The elevated volatility under the 
counterfactual scenario indicates that extending the borrowing 
term was an effective action in reducing the implicit costs of 
borrowing and hence controlling funds market volatility. 
In addition to extending the borrowing term, the Federal 
Reserve also narrowed the spread between the primary credit 
rate and the target rate from 100 basis points to 25 basis points 
during the crisis. Our earlier findings in Artuç and Demiralp 
(2010) would suggest that the primary credit rate works as an 
upper bound in the absence of market stigma and that a decline 
in this rate should decrease deviations of the funds rate from 
the target. Our next simulation keeps the spread between the 
primary credit rate and the target unchanged at 100 basis 
points. As shown in Chart 9, the counterfactual spread is at 
least as high as the benchmark simulation, if not higher. 
This elevated volatility suggests that the narrowing of the 
spread was an effective action, even though the difference 
between the counterfactual and benchmark simulations is not 
as outstanding as in the previous exercises, probably because of 
the increased need for collateral under the crisis conditions. 
That is, because federal funds borrowing is unsecuritized, 
whereas discount window borrowing requires collateral, 50 Provision of Liquidity through the Primary Credit Facility
Chart 10
Daily High Funds Rate Less Target 
(with 10 Percent Higher Average Reserves)
Sources: Primary credit outstanding: Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release H.4.1; required operating balances: Federal Reserve Board; 
simulated series: authors’ calculations.
Note: Required operating balances is the sum of required reserve 





















Primary Credit Outstanding 
(with 10 Percent Higher Average Reserves)
Normalized with Required Operating Balances
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (daily high funds rate: 
http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 
(target: http://newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm); 



















certain banks may still need to borrow in the funds market 
and pay a higher premium if they lack sufficient collateral for 
discount borrowing. 
Recently, the Federal Reserve has been granted the authority 
to pay interest on reserve balances. In addition to placing a 
theoretical lower bound on the funds rate, interest payments 
on reserve balances may increase the demand for balances 
simply because the cost of holding these balances has been 
reduced. Our last exercise considers the impact of a higher level 
of balances on controlling funds rate volatility. While it is 
difficult to estimate the precise magnitude of the change in 
reserve balances, we increase the average normalized reserve 
balances by 10 percent in our counterfactual experiment. 
Chart 10 shows that control over interest rates improves while 
Chart 11 shows that the need for borrowing declines if the 
average balance holdings increase, as predicted under this new 
regime. Together, these results suggest that any policy change 
that leads to an increase in reserve holdings, such as interest 
payments on reserves, is useful in stabilizing the money 
markets.
5.C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of various changes 
adopted by the Federal Reserve since the onset of the liquidity 
crisis in August 2007. We show that the steps taken to reduce 
the implicit costs of borrowing were more effective in 
stabilizing the money markets while the narrowing of the 
spread between the primary credit rate and the target was not 
as effective. 
Would the Federal Reserve be well served to retain these 
changes to its borrowing facility indefinitely? Our results 
suggest that the spread between the primary credit rate and the 
target rate could be increased back to 100 basis points without 
much impact on the financial markets. Meanwhile, the recent 
policy change of paying interest on reserves should make it 
easier for the Federal Reserve’s Trading Desk to maintain the 
target permanently, not only by placing a lower bound on the 
funds rate, but also by increasing the level of reserve balances—
which should reduce the demand for borrowing and ease the 
resulting tightness in the funds markets. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 51
Panels A and B of the table on the next page present ordinary 
least squares estimates of the auxiliary model parameters using 
actual as well as simulated data along with the mean and the 
variance of borrowing and  . Comparing columns 2 and 4 of 
panel A, we note that the auxiliary model’s estimates from the 
simulated data and the actual data are fairly similar, as the 
algorithm minimizes the distance between those two estimates. 
However, they are not identical, as the auxiliary model has 
more parameters than the true underlying model. As shown in 
row 5, borrowing responsiveness to the interest rate spread ( ) 
increases significantly after the Federal Reserve policy change 
in 2003, consistent with a decline in market stigma associated 
with discount window borrowing and the revival of the 
borrowing function. Panel B provides a similar comparison 
between the moments generated by the actual data (column 2) 
and those computed from the simulated data (column 3). 
Similar to panel A, the two sets of statistics display a strong 
resemblance. 
Panel C presents the parameter estimates of the true 
underlying model and their standard errors. The most 
interesting parameters for our purposes are displayed in rows 1 
and 2. Notice that the implicit fixed cost of borrowing declines 
about 90 percent (from   to  ) after the 
policy change in 2003. This result provides strong evidence that 
the Fed’s new policy was indeed successful in reducing the 
stigma associated with discount window borrowing. In 
addition to estimating the fixed cost of borrowing from the 
discount window, we are also interested in determining 
whether this implicit cost exhibits any gradual changes over 
time. In particular, one may expect a gradual decline in the 
implicit cost of borrowing in the post-2003 period because of 
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this issue, we experimented with an alternative model that 
allows for a time trend in the implicit cost of borrowing prior 
to and after 2003 (not shown). However, the trend terms 
associated with the implicit cost of borrowing were not 
significant in either sample. This finding suggests that there 
may not be a gradual adjustment to the new regime in the 
second sample. Our results may also be driven by the fact that 
we may not have a sufficient number of observations to identify 
such a time trend.
Row 3 of panel C shows that the aggregate reserve shock   
ranges between -0.43 and 0.43 in the beginning of the sample, 
while row 4 shows that the bank-specific reserve shock   
varies between -0.34 and 0.34 initially. Rows 5 and 6 show that 
there is a significant time trend in these shocks. In fact, when 
we substitute the estimates for D and E in equation 3, we 
observe that the aggregate reserve shock exhibits a negative 
trend while the bank-specific shock exhibits a positive trend. 
The estimate of E implies that the standard error of   
decreases about 0.05 percent per year while the estimate of D 
implies that the range of   increases about 15 percent each 
year. The mild negative time trend in the aggregate shock,  , 
could reflect improvements in the Federal Reserve Trading 
Desk’s reserve management ability over time, as we observe in 
this paper. 
Row 7 of panel C shows that the estimated ratio of banks 
that incur a technical problem, and thus are forced to borrow 
from the Fed rather than the markets, varies from 0 to 0.04. 
This result indicates that no more than 4 percent of banks are 
affected by this type of condition at any time. Row 10 indicates 
that banks seek to attain a higher level of balances on the last 









Appendix52 Provision of Liquidity through the Primary Credit Facility
Appendix (Continued)
Auxiliary Model and Indirect Inference Estimations
Panel A: Auxiliary Model Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Actual Data Simulated Data
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
1. Constant 0.48** 0.07 0.53** 0.04
2. 0.26** 0.05 0.35** 0.03
3.  t -0.04** 0.01 -0.05** 0.004
4. 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.005
5. 0.86** 0.22 1.01** 0.10
6. 0.46** 0.11 0.48** 0.07
Panel B: Auxiliary Model Moments
Actual Data Simulated Data
1. Mean(BR) 0.46 0.45
2. Mean( ) 0.42 0.37
3. Mean( ) 0.25 0.25
4. Var( ) 3.01 2.15
5. Var( ) 1.14 1.93
6. Var( ) 0.14 0.08




3. A 0.4257** 0.001
4. B 0.3432** 0.0008
5. D -0.0010** 0.0005
6. E 0.2001** 0.0007
7. F 0.0421** 0.0004
8. 0.8594** 0.0034
9.  s 0.0027 0.00001
10. 0.4828 0.0016
Where:
BR normalized borrowing from the Federal Reserve
daily high funds rate minus target rate
lowest 50 percent of daily high funds rate less target rate
t time trend
dummy variable for period after January 6, 2003
dummy variable for last day of maintenance period
implicit cost prior to 2003
implicit cost after 2003
A  interval parameter for aggregate shock
B interval parameter for bank-specific shock
D time trend parameter for aggregate shock
E time trend parameter for bank-specific shock
F interval parameter for probability of technical problem
average reserve balances
s variance of noise parameter for daily high funds rate
implicit reserve target on last day of maintenance period
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
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